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Ellul thinks that unity in a political system 
means that life has gone out of it. Tension and conflict 
form personality, “not only on the loftiest, most 
personal plane, but also on the collective plane.” I see a 
resemblance to Emmanuel Levinas and the latter’s 
perception that the goal of ataraxy conflicts with the 
obligation to respect the otherness of the other. To 
avoid disturbances to our tranquillity we would like to 
make others the same as ourselves. But one only has to 
look at Canadian history and the effect of Lord 
Durham’s goal of assimilating the French Canadians to 
see what enduring resentments this attitude can cause. 
Ellul is conscious of writing largely from the 
experience of France since Louis XIV, but he need not 
apologize for thinking his ideas might have larger 
application. Centralizing forces exist the world over, 
and they need to be kept in check.  He thinks it 
important to permit the emergence of social, political, 
intellectual, artistic, religious and other groups, totally 
independent of the state, “yet capable of opposing it, 
able to reject its pressures as well as its controls and 
even its gifts.” (222) 
He thinks these organizations and associations 
should be able to deny that “the nation is the supreme 
value and that the state is the incarnation of the 
nation.”  He allows that there is a risk in reducing the 
central power but sees this as “the condition of life.” 
Ellul wrote before the arrival of the Internet. 
We have seen that the ability of the centralized powers 
in the United States to shape opinion by false imagery 
failed spectacularly in the attempts to make war heroes 
out of Jessica Lynch and Pat Tillman - the latter former 
professional football star having been in fact a victim 
of “friendly fire.” Contrary credible evidence 
circulating through Web sites such as Truthout, 
Common Dreams, PRWatch and the like was sufficient 
to force the image-makers to backtrack. 
But there is no guarantee that the freedom 
exercized by those Web site operators will continue 
indefinitely, and we can expect battles in this area as 
well as on other fronts, such as the attempts to force 
television stations that show government video news 
releases to acknowledge their provenance in a way that 
will minimize their deceptive propensities. 
The trouble with illusions is that they are 
comforting, and if our vision of life is to maximize 
comfort, why bother attacking them? One reason is that 
illusions can lead to political mistakes which can have 
most uncomfortable outcomes. Another reason, 
though, is that other goals and conditions of a good life 
include such things as such as honesty, freedom, 
integrity, and respect for the Other, and these are 
incompatible with the pertinent illusions.  
We have to be willing to engage in political 
life and work for our desired goals, but always in such 
a way as to preserve our respect for the freedom and 
dignity of others, even when our goals collide. “We 
should forever be concerned with the means used by 
the state, the politicians, our group, ourselves.” (238) 
We also have to track down those stereotypes and 
myths in our own thinking so as to free ourselves from 
them, for as long as they exist “no freedom or 
democratic creativity is possible.” (240) Coming from 
Ellul, the message is not new, but time and events 
(including dire environmental forecasts) have merely 
reinforced its urgency. 
Jacques Ellul 
Autopsy of Revolution   
New York: Knopf, 1971 
Original edition Autopsie de la Révolution (Paris: 
Calmann-Lévy, 1969) 
Re-viewed by Andy Alexis-Baker 
Associated Menonite Biblical Seminary, Elkhart IN 
In this book Ellul delves into history arguing 
that until the 18th
Then came the French Revolution which 
changed traditional revolt in two ways: a future 
oriented outlook and belief in the state as the bearer of 
freedom. The aristocratic leaders envisioned a utopian 
society which a scientific outlook would bring about. 
Inspired by the French Revolution, Karl Marx made 
revolution part of history’s evolution. Thus revolution 
became normalized and predictable. All that was 
needed were the right techniques to predict the 
conditions under which the masses would explode and 
to direct the explosions into seizing control of the state, 
which under the direction of new management would 
take on a totally new character: communist. 
 century revolt had been conservative 
and opposed to political and social change. These 
upheavals revolted against unbearable situations 
resulting from increased state functions. As such, 
revolution (or revolt) reacted against the expected 
course of history and usually wanted to restore a 
previous situation.  
Ellul argues that in reality the state has its own 
internal logic and structure so that those who think they 
can control the state are under an illusion, instead that 
logic and structure controls the revolutionary. 
Revolution, rather than decreasing state power, has 
increased the state’s reach. The dehumanizing, 
rationalized gaze of the state has penetrated into every 
area of life. It is state power, more than colonialism or 
class conflict, that truly threatens human freedom. Here 
Ellul becomes relentless in his attack on every aspect 
of the nation-state.  
Ellul suggest that the alternative to state 
fetishism is a revolution invoking “direct personal 
responsibility” (282). Much contemporary discourse is 
still based upon the notion that where real “politics” or 
action occurs is in the impersonal machinery in Paris or 
Washington D.C. Ellul, however, insists that the only 
real thing is the person—spiritual, physical and mental. 
Call it anarchism, personalism or situationism (Ellul 
uses all these terms while recognizing differences), the 
idea is the same. Real change happens where people 
begin to take responsibility. For Ellul modern electoral 
democracy attempts to tame the inherent anarchy and 
unruliness contained in democracy. 
Ellul does not call for traditional 
individualism. He makes clear how statism and the 
technological society create individuals who are 
incapable of making decisions that run against 
nationalist or technological ends. Yet because of his 
polemic against a herd mentality, he fails to make clear 
that rootedeness and loyalty to a certain type of 
community helps individuals become whole persons, 
without which the lures of the technological society 
quickly overwhelm. For me—a Mennonite—Ellul’s 
failure to place individuals in community is 
inexcusable. The state is primarily about creating 
individuals without attachment to healthy community 
and loyalties that make it possibile to fight the 
technological society. At times Ellul seems to forget 
that while the great Fascist and Communist regimes 
depended upon massive public support, our own 
democracies depend upon mass apathy and 
individualization. 
Despite his failure to name types of 
community that resist state expansion and the 
technological society, this book is valuable for Ellul 
Forum readers to re-read. The dominant emphasis from 
the Ellul Forum has been the pitfalls of the 
technological society. Yet Ellul insists, “Any 
revolution against the perils and the bondage of 
technological society implies an attempt to disassemble 
the state” (268).  
Ellul’s claim that the state is the object of 
revolution is also true for advocates of nonviolent 
techniques. Gene Sharp and others tout the great 
“nonviolent revolutions,” but using Ellul’s outlines it is 
best to point out that this is just another vulgarization 
of the word. No revolution has occurred in any 
Western nation since Ellul’s book. What happened 
were in-house regime changes. No Western 
“revolution” has successfully dismantled the state and 
the technological apparatus (the Zapatistas in Chiapas, 
however, come closer to Ellul’s vision). 
Finally, if a future edition of this book were 
printed, it would benefit from a critical apparatus and 
an index. Ellul mentions and discusses numerous 
names, places and movements that North American 
readers cannot understand without editorial footnotes. 
Despite these flaws in the apparatus of the book, the 
content remains relevant for those of us concerned 
about the expected course of history. Ellul’s call is for 
revolt against this dark future looming over us. And it 
remains as dark as Ellul ever predicted it would be. 
Jacques Ellul 
False Presence of the Kingdom  
New York: Seabury, 1972 
Original edition, Fausse présence au monde moderne 
(Paris: Les Bergers et les Mages, 1963) 
Re-viewed by Virginia W. Landgraf 
American Theological Library Association, Chicago IL 
False Presence of the Kingdom is a critique of 
certain kinds of Christian political activity as failing to 
live up to Christians' true calling.  This failure has 
theological and sociological dimensions.   Ellul goes 
into both aspects in more depth elsewhere.  He admits 
that the book is best understood in the context of The 
Political Illusion and his work on Christian ethics 
(later published as To Will and To Do and The Ethics 
of Freedom).  Also, the distinction between truth and 
reality, not fully elaborated until The Humiliation of 
the Word, is helpful for understanding this book, as is 
the image from Apocalypse of the Word of God (the 
white horse) providing counterpoint to the forces of 
history (the other three horses) in Rev. 6:2-7. 
At this period in his thought, as developed in 
the essay “Rappels et réflexions sur une théologie de 
l'État,” Ellul allows a legitimate role for political 
authority (not necessarily the abstract state) as 
administrator of common patrimony.  Thus its 
responsibilities are within the realm of reality (visible, 
measurable results, accomplished by power); it goes 
beyond its bounds if it arrogates to itself the realm of 
truth (values and ultimate human destiny, 
communicated by personal words, the precondition for 
which is freedom).  How far one agrees with Ellul's 
arguments depends largely on how far one agrees with 
his opposition between freedom and power.  
Legitimate political authority is in an awkward 
position: it needs to have a modicum of power over 
